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     The District Court defined the class as: “All purchasers of1
the securities of Constar International, Inc. (‘Constar’ or ‘the
Company’) issued pursuant to or traceable to the Company’s
Registration Statement/Prospectus (the ‘Registration Statement’)
for Constar’s November 14, 2002 initial public offering (‘IPO’
(continued...)
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
In this securities class action, defendants Constar
International, Crown Holdings, Salomon Smith Barney,
Citigroup Global Markets, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank Securities,
J.P. Morgan Securities, and Lazard Freres & Co. appeal the
District Court’s Order granting class certification.  Defendants
argue that the District Court erred by adopting a liberal
construction of Rule 23 in favor of class certification, by not
conducting a rigorous analysis of the Rule 23 requirements for
class certification—especially as to the predominance
inquiry—and by failing to consider the opinion of defendants’
expert.  We disagree, and conclude that the District Court
properly granted class certification. 
Constar manufactures PET (polyethylene terephthalate)
plastic food and beverage containers.  Its initial public offering
(“IPO”) occurred on November 14, 2002, when its parent
company and co-defendant, Crown Holdings, sold 10.5 million
shares to the public at an offering price of $12.00 per share.
Plaintiffs,  who purchased registered shares from that offering,1
    (...continued)1
or the ‘Offering’) seeking to pursue remedies under the
Securities Act of 1933 (the ‘Securities Act’).”  (Joint App. 27.)
5
claim that this price was inflated because Constar’s registration
statement contained materially false and misleading statements,
and because it omitted required information.  Plaintiffs seek
relief against Constar under § 11 of the Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. § 77k, which “provides a private right of action to
individuals who have suffered harm from misstatements in an
issuer’s registration statement.”  In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig.,
432 F.3d 261, 273 (3d Cir. 2005).  They also seek judgment
against Constar’s underwriters and controlling entities (the
remaining defendants named above) under § 15 of the Securities
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77o. 
According to plaintiffs, the registration statement
misrepresented Constar as a competitive business with a strong
future when, in fact, its business was deteriorating and weak.
Specifically, they allege that Constar materially misrepresented
the company’s goodwill, assets, operational strength and
capacity, equipment quality, and customer base.  Plaintiffs also
allege that Constar’s parent, Crown Holdings, had transferred a
substantial part of Crown’s debt to Constar as part of Constar’s
IPO.
Plaintiffs allege that these misrepresentations became
apparent to the market in the summer of 2003.  On July 29,
62003, Constar acknowledged in a press release that its second-
quarter results were disappointing, and in a conference call the
next day attributed these results to the loss of important
customers and the absence of an expected technological
superiority compared to its competitors.  Plaintiffs allege that
these disclosures caused Constar’s stock to drop thirty percent,
from $9.17 per share on July 28, 2003, to $6.00 per share on
July 30, 2003.  On August 14, 2003, Constar issued a press
release reflecting the impairment of its financial goodwill “[d]ue
to the trading price of the Company’s common stock and other
factors.”  (Joint App. 128.)  According to plaintiffs, this was a
belated disclosure because the market had already absorbed the
information regarding the goodwill impairment and other
business problems.  However, defendants maintain that the truth
about the alleged goodwill misrepresentations did not become
apparent to the market until the August 14 press release.
Moreover, they claim that the losses after the July disclosures
were predicated on lower sales and higher inventory costs due
to unseasonable weather conditions, not the factors identified by
plaintiffs.  
Plaintiffs filed suit on September 5, 2003, by which time
Constar’s stock was trading at $5.20 per share.  The District
Court referred plaintiffs’ motion for class certification to retired
Magistrate Judge Diane Welsh and appointed her as Special
Master.  The Special Master recommended class certification,
and the District Court adopted the Special Master’s reasoning
and approved her Report.  The court certified the class,
7concluding that “plaintiffs established the elements required by
Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3).”  (Joint App. 31.)  Defendants filed a
timely appeal. 
We granted defendants’ petition for an interlocutory
appeal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f).  The District Court had
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337.  We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f).
Our review of a district court’s grant of class certification
is for “abuse of discretion, which occurs if the district court’s
decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant
conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.”  In
re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 312 (3d
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).  We review de
novo whether an incorrect legal standard has been used.  Id.
Since “each requirement of Rule 23 must be met, a district court
errs as a matter of law when it fails to resolve a genuine legal or
factual dispute relevant to determining the requirements.”  Id. at
320.  Any matter relevant to Rule 23’s prerequisites for class
certification, including an expert’s opinion, requires a “rigorous
analysis,” in which a court must “‘assess all of the relevant
evidence admitted at the class certification stage.’”  Id. at 323
(quoting In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 42
(2d Cir. 2006)).  The mandates “set out in Rule 23 are not mere
pleading rules.”  Id. at 316.  Unless each requirement is actually
met, a class cannot be certified.  Id. at 320.
8Rule 23 contains two sets of requirements.  First, a party
seeking class certification must demonstrate that the class
satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(a): 
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable [numerosity]; (2) there
are questions of law or fact common to the class
[commonality]; (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class [typicality]; and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class [adequacy]. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).  Second, plaintiffs must show that the
requirements of one of the provisions of Rule 23(b) are met.
Plaintiffs here sought certification under Rule 23(b)(3), which
requires a finding by the District Court “that the questions of
law or fact common to class members predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”  Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3).  These requirements are known as predominance and
superiority.
Although we afford a district court “broad discretion” in
Rule 23 matters, we require that each Rule 23 component be
satisfied.  Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 310 (citing Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 630 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
9concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that Rule 23
decisions implicate “highly fact-based, complex, and difficult
matters”)).  Class certification is an especially serious decision,
as it “is often the defining moment in class actions (for it may
sound the ‘death knell’ of the litigation on the part of plaintiffs,
or create unwarranted pressure to settle nonmeritorious claims
on the part of defendants).”   Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2001). 
The standards by which this Court evaluates class
certification motions are well established.  In Hydrogen
Peroxide, we instructed district courts, where appropriate, to
“‘delve beyond the pleadings to determine whether the
requirements for class certification are satisfied.’”  552 F.3d at
316 (quoting Newton,  259 F.3d at 167).  “An overlap between
a class certification requirement and the merits of a claim is no
reason to decline to resolve relevant disputes when necessary to
determine whether a class certification requirement is met.”  Id.
The predominance inquiry is especially dependent upon the
merits of a plaintiff’s claim, since “the ‘nature of the evidence
that will suffice to resolve a question determines whether the
question is common or individual.’”  Id. at 310-11 (quoting
Blades v. Monsanto Co., 400 F.3d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 2005)).
“‘If proof of the essential elements of the cause of action
requires individual treatment,’” then predominance is defeated
and a class should not be certified.  Id. (quoting Newton, 259
F.3d at 172).  
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Defendants argue that the District Court made several
errors in certifying the class.  First, they claim that the District
Court improperly applied a “liberal construction” of Rule 23’s
requirements for class certification, and failed to conduct a
sufficiently rigorous analysis of whether the proposed class
satisfied these requirements.  Second, they argue that the District
Court inadequately described the class definition and the claims
at issue in the litigation.  Third, they argue that it was improper
for the District Court to have decided the class certification
motion without deciding whether the market for Constar’s stock
was “efficient.”  Fourth, they argue that the District Court
should not have found that the predominance requirement could
be met with respect to the issues of loss causation and injury.
Fifth, they claim that the District Court failed to consider the
testimony of their expert when deciding the class certification
motion.  None of these arguments are convincing.
Our decision is guided by Hydrogen Peroxide, which was
decided after the District Court granted class certification.  Even
without the benefit of that case, however, the District Court’s
application of the class certification standards comported with
the guidelines established by this Court.  
Defendants suggest that the District Court applied a
“liberal construction” of Rule 23’s requirements for class
certification.  Defendants’ argument relies on a statement that
appears in both the Special Master’s Report and the District
Court’s Order: “[This Court] has adopted a liberal construction
11
of Rule 23 when considering shareholder suits, declaring that
the interest[s] of justice require[] that in a doubtful case . . . any
error[,] if there is to be one, should be committed in favor of
allowing a class action.”  (Joint App. 202, 30 (quoting In re
Regal Commc’ns Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 94-179, 1995 WL
550454, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 1995) (quoting Eisenberg v.
Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 785 (3d Cir. 1985))) (internal quotation
marks omitted).)
Defendants argue that this statement was representative
of the District Court’s and Special Master’s analyses.  However,
after noting the language from Eisenberg, the Special Master
cited the need for a rigorous analysis to meet the requirements
of Rule 23, and spent the next twenty-five pages undertaking
such an analysis.  The Special Master discussed the four
requirements of Rule 23(a) (i.e., numerosity, commonality,
typicality, and adequacy of representation) in turn, and
addressed defendants’ arguments as to each element.  The
Special Master then considered the predominance and
superiority requirements and addressed defendants’ arguments
on those elements.  The District Court reviewed the Special
Master’s analysis and conclusions and adopted her findings,
noting that “after careful examination of the substantial
materials presented by the parties, the Report correctly found
that plaintiffs established the elements required by Rules 23(a)
and 23(b)(3).”  (Joint App. 30-31) (emphasis added).  Nowhere
in the analysis does the Special Master or the District Court
12
identify a presumption in favor of class certification or suggest
that class certification is appropriate in close cases. 
 In fact, even though this case predates Hydrogen
Peroxide, the Special Master’s analysis and treatment of
Eisenberg is quite similar to our analysis in that case.  In
Hydrogen Peroxide, we clarified the Eisenberg language at
issue, stating:
Although the trial court has discretion to grant or
deny class certification, the court should not
suppress “doubt” as to whether a Rule 23
requirement is met—no matter the area of
substantive law.  Accordingly, Eisenberg should
not be understood to encourage certification in the
face of doubt as to whether a Rule 23 requirement
has been met.  Eisenberg predates the recent
amendments to Rule 23 which, as noted, reject
tentative decisions on certification and encourage
development of a record sufficient for informed
analysis.  We recognize the Supreme Court has
observed that “[p]redominance is a test readily
met in certain cases alleging consumer or
securities fraud or violations of the antitrust
laws.”  Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625.  But it does not
follow that a court should relax its certification
analysis, or presume a requirement for
certification is met, merely because a plaintiff’s
13
claims fall within one of those substantive
categories.  
552 F.3d at 321-22 (certain citations omitted).  Similarly, after
citing the “liberal” Eisenberg language, the Special Master
continued:  “Nevertheless, since courts may approve class
actions only after a rigorous analysis and findings that the class
satisfies all the requirements of Rule 23, it is necessary to
address each of the four elements of Rule 23(a) and the elements
of Rule 23(b)(3) . . . .”  (Joint App. 202.)  
In sum, defendants’ characterization of the class
certification standard applied by the District Court is incorrect.
Defendants misleadingly emphasize the Eisenberg language
without discussion of the lengthy class certification analysis by
the Special Master that followed in her Report, which was
adopted by the District Court.  The Eisenberg references in the
Special Master’s Report and the District Court’s Opinion were
not conclusions, but rather a preface to further analysis.  Further,
there was no “tie breaking” or “erring on plaintiffs’ side.”  The
Rule 23 standard applied by the District Court and Special
Master was proper. 
Contrary to defendants’ contention, we also find no error
in the District Court’s description of the class definition and
claims at issue in the litigation.  Under Wachtel v. Guardian Life
Insurance Co. of America, 453 F.3d 179, 187-88 (3d Cir. 2006),
we require that each class certification order contain
     See supra note 1.  2
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“(1) a readily discernible, clear, and precise statement of the
parameters defining the class or classes to be certified, and
(2) a readily discernible, clear, and complete list of the claims,
issues or defenses to be treated on a class basis.”  In Wachtel, we
found the district court’s certification order defective because its
“discussion of class claims, issues, or defenses [was] unclear,
intermittent, and incomplete,” and because it failed to “define
which claims, issues, or defenses are to be treated on a class
basis for the remainder of the litigation.”  Id. at 189.  Here, the
District Court and Special Master stated the parameters of the
putative class,  and outlined how the plaintiffs’ claims under2
§§ 11 and 15 of the Securities Act, and the defendants’
affirmative defenses, would proceed on a classwide basis.  The
District Court’s Order was clearly sufficient.
Defendants’ principal argument on appeal is that the
District Court could not have properly decided the class
certification motion without first deciding whether the market
for Constar’s securities was “efficient.”  According to
defendants, if the market was inefficient, then questions of
materiality, loss causation, and injury would need to be decided
on an individual basis, and the class would not satisfy the
predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).  Defendants also
contend that if the market was efficient, the alleged
misrepresentations could not have caused a loss because
15
subsequent disclosures did not actually correct the
misrepresentations or cause Constar’s stock price to decline.
The error in this reasoning is that plaintiffs’ case is
brought under § 11 of the Securities Act, rather than § 10(b) of
the Exchange Act.  A prima facie case under § 11 is
straightforward, requiring only a showing of a material
misrepresentation or omission from a defendant’s registration
statement.  Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,
382 (1983).  That is, § 11 imposes liability “if a registration
statement, as of its effective date:  (1) contained an untrue
statement of material fact; (2) omitted to state a material fact
required to be stated therein; or (3) omitted to state a material
fact necessary to make the statements therein not misleading.”
In re Suprema Specialties, Inc. Sec. Litig., 438 F.3d 256, 269
(3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We have previously stated that §§ 11 and 10(b) share the
tests for materiality, including the test set forth by the Supreme
Court in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. and the “stock-
price test” for materiality in an efficient market.  Merck, 432
F.3d at 273.  Under TSC, a “fact is material if there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would
consider it important” in making an investment decision.  TSC
Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).  We
have also “fashioned a special Rule for measuring materiality in
the context of an efficient securities market.”  Oran v. Stafford,
226 F.3d 275, 282 (3d Cir. 2000).  In that context, “the
     Plaintiffs here filed suit about ten months after Constar’s3
IPO.
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materiality of disclosed information may be measured post hoc
by looking to the movement, in the period immediately
following disclosure, of the price of the firm’s stock.”  Id.  Thus,
while materiality can be shown by a drop in price in reaction to
a disclosure in an efficient market, that does not mean that it is
necessary to consider the efficiency of a market in assessing
materiality in a § 11 case, whether an individual or class action.
Indeed, as is discussed below, it is not at all relevant.  
Loss causation under § 11 is even less complex than the
materiality inquiry.  In a § 11 case, plaintiffs do not have the
burden of proving causation, although defendants “may assert,
as an affirmative defense, that a lower share value did not result
from any nondisclosure or false statement.”  In re Adams Golf
Inc. Sec. Litig., 381 F.3d 267, 277 (3d Cir. 2004).  Similarly,
plaintiffs do not need to establish reliance on an issuer’s
statements, unless they purchased the stock more than “twelve
months . . . after the effective date of the registration statement.”
15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).   Under § 11(e), the measure of damages is3
set as the difference between the price paid for a security
purchased pursuant to the registration statement, and the price
at the time suit was filed or the security was sold.  15 U.S.C.
§ 77k(e). “[A]ny decline in value is presumed to be caused by
the misrepresentation in the registration statement . . . .”
McMahan & Co. v. Wherehouse Entm’t, Inc., 65 F.3d 1044,
17
1048 (2d Cir. 1995).  Thus, the elements of a § 11 claim “stand
in stark contrast” to those of a claim under the Exchange Act
(such as a § 10(b) claim), which requires “a showing of
reasonable reliance and scienter.”  Adams Golf, 381 F.3d at 273
n.5.
Defendants, however, argue that determinations of
materiality, loss causation, and injury first require a
determination of whether the market for Constar’s stock was
efficient.  This argument is premised on the Efficient Market
Hypothesis, which, as described by defendants’ expert,
Dr. Jarrell, holds that 
as new information causes investors to revise their
expectations about future cash flows and growth
opportunities, the market price of a security traded
in an efficient market responds quickly and
rationally to reflect this new information.  This
means that in an efficient market, information is
quickly absorbed by the market and the impact of
this information is nearly instantaneously
reflected in the market price. 
(Joint App. 193-94.)  Accordingly, a security’s “quoted price
always reflects all available information.”  (Joint App. 194.)  On
the other hand, “in an inefficient market there is no presumption
that all publicly available information is known.  Therefore, . .
18
. [the] quoted price will not reflect all available information
about the stock.”  Id.   
As an example, Dr. Jarrell explains that “in an efficient
market, an announcement that a company was restating a prior
earnings report . . . would be immediately incorporated into a
company’s stock price, and one would expect to see a decline in
the quoted price.”  Id.  Conversely, in an inefficient market,
“[t]he value of any individual’s shares would not necessarily
have been affected at all by that particular bit of information
because the ‘mix of information’ made available to one investor
will tend to vary widely from the ‘mix of information’ which is
available to the next investor.”  (Joint App. 194-95.)  Therefore,
in an inefficient market, to determine the importance of new
information, “one would need to undertake an investor by
investor inquiry.”  (Joint App. 195.)  Such an individualized
inquiry would likely defeat Rule 23’s predominance
requirement. 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis can be useful in
assessing the materiality of misrepresentations in securities
actions, including § 11 claims and claims made under § 10(b) of
the Exchange Act.  As noted above, we have previously held
that a drop in stock price in an efficient market is one way to
show materiality.  Oran, 226 F.3d at 282.  Defendants, however,
leap from this principle to a sweeping assertion that, in an
inefficient market, materiality is necessarily an investor-by-
investor inquiry because, “when a market lacks efficiency, there
19
is no assurance that the market price was affected by the
defendant’s alleged misstatement at all.  Instead, the price may
reflect information wholly unrelated to the misstatement.”
Appellants’ Br. at 52 (quoting In re Polymedica Corp. Sec.
Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2005)).  Not surprisingly,
Polymedica, and many of the other cases defendants cite for this
proposition, are § 10(b) cases, where a plaintiff-investor’s
reliance on a defendant’s misrepresentations is a crucial element
of each case.  However, reliance is not an element under § 11.
Adams Golf, 381 F.3d at 273 n.5.  As the District Court noted,
because reliance is not an element under § 11, “the conduct of
the defendants, not the knowledge of the plaintiffs, is
determinative” of materiality.  (Joint App. 28.)  The crucial
questions are: “[W]as there a misrepresentation?  And, if so, was
it objectively material?”  (Joint App. 29.)  Since reliance is
irrelevant in a § 11 case, a § 11 case will never demand
individualized proof as to an investor’s reliance or knowledge
(except where more than twelve months have passed since the
registration statement became effective).  Further, because a
misrepresentation is material if a reasonable investor would
have considered a fact important, the effect of a material
misrepresentation is felt uniformly across the class of investors,
regardless of whether the market is efficient.  Since this is an
objective standard, materiality is not determined, as Dr. Jarrell
contends, by the “mix of information” available to each
individual plaintiff.
20
Defendants also maintain that plaintiffs have failed to
prove that loss causation and injury were common issues that
would predominate, and urge that the District Court erred by
holding otherwise.  They analogize their case to Newton, where,
“[b]ecause plaintiffs’ claims . . . require[d] an economic injury
determination for each trade,” the class failed “to satisfy the
predominance requirement.”  259 F.3d at 190.   Again,
defendants’ argument might be persuasive if this were a § 10(b)
case.  Section 11 does not require a showing of individualized
loss causation, because injury and loss are presumed under § 11.
It bears repeating that, in a § 11 case, plaintiffs do not bear the
burden of proving causation, damages are calculated as the
difference between the purchase price of a security and the price
at the time suit was filed or the security was sold, and any
decline in value is presumed to be caused by the
misrepresentation.  15 U.S.C. § 77k(e); Adams Golf, 381 F.3d at
277; McMahan, 65 F.3d at 1048; see also Alaska Elec. Pension
Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 234 (5th Cir. 2009) (per
curiam).
We also note that, although loss causation is an
affirmative defense in a § 11 case, this defense would not defeat
predominance here.  Section 11(e) allows defendants to “limit
damages by showing that plaintiffs’ losses were caused by
something other than their misrepresentations.”  Merck, 432
F.3d at 274.  Any affirmative defense on this ground would
present a common issue—not an individual one.  If something
other than the alleged misrepresentations produced a drop in
     Defendants’ support for their position that Dura applies in4
(continued...)
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stock price, be it the weather, market conditions, or any other
factor, class members would be affected uniformly.  If, for
example, Investors X, Y, and Z all purchase Security A, and
Security A’s price happens to fall dramatically in the ensuing
months, the cause of that decline would not differ as to each
investor.
Relying on Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544
U.S. 336 (2005), defendants argue that to establish loss
causa tion , p la in tif f s  must show  tha t Cons tar ’s
misrepresentations were actually corrected by its subsequent
disclosures.  It urges that this is not the case here and, therefore,
that each trade must be individually analyzed. 
As the Special Master pointed out, defendants’ reliance upon
Dura is misplaced.  Dura addressed how plaintiffs in a § 10(b)
case can satisfy the requirement that they prove that a
misrepresentation “proximately caused the plaintiff[s’]
economic loss.”  544 U.S. at 346.  The Court held that the “loss”
element could not be proven by merely showing that a
misrepresentation caused the price of a security to be inflated at
the time of purchase; rather, it must be shown that the
misrepresentation actually caused a later economic loss.  Id. at
342-43.  Since loss causation is presumed, and loss is easily
proven, in the § 11 context, Dura is totally inapposite.4
    (...continued)4
the § 11 context consists of only inapposite unpublished
opinions and cases decided before Dura.  For instance,
McKowan Lowe & Co. v. Jasmine, Ltd., 231 F. App’x 216, 218
(3d Cir. 2007), is of little relevance here since plaintiffs’ claims
there were disposed of because plaintiffs could not point to any
corrective disclosures—direct or indirect—revealing the alleged
misrepresentations.  Plaintiffs here, as the Special Master
recognized, allege a substantial loss occurring after the July
disclosures.  McKowan says nothing about Dura’s applicability
to this sort of § 11 claim, where plaintiffs can point to a
corrective disclosure.  In re Alamosa Holdings, Inc. Securities
Litigation, 382 F. Supp. 2d 832, 865-66 (N.D. Tex. 2005), was
decided prior to Dura, and the court dismissed the § 11 claim
because the alleged misrepresentations occurred after the
registration statement was filed.  Similarly, In re Merrill Lynch
& Co. Research Securities Litigation, 272 F. Supp. 2d 243, 253-
255 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), was decided before Dura.    
22
In sum, on both the materiality and loss causation fronts,
we find the market efficiency issue to be a red herring.  The
formulaic nature of § 11 leaves defendants with little room to
maneuver.  Were this a § 10(b) claim, or another claim requiring
reliance and proof of loss causation, the efficiency issue might
be instructive, if not dispositive.  However, where reliance and
loss causation are not part of the equation, an individualized
inquiry is not required.  
23
Both the Special Master and the District Court reached a
similar conclusion and, contrary to defendants’ suggestion,
properly disposed of the market efficiency issue before
certifying the class.  Hydrogen Peroxide held that a lower court
adjudicating a Rule 23 motion “must make whatever factual and
legal inquiries are necessary . . . even if they overlap with the
merits” and, in doing so, “may delve beyond the pleadings to
determine whether the requirements for class certification are
satisfied.”  552 F.3d at 307, 316 (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).  Here, although neither the District Court nor
the Special Master had the benefit of Hydrogen Peroxide’s
instructions, both “delved” into the market efficiency issue, and
both correctly dismissed the argument that the issue of market
efficiency would affect predominance. 
Defendants also argue that the District Court improperly
ignored their expert’s testimony.  It is true that “a court’s
obligation to consider all relevant evidence and arguments
extends to expert testimony.”  Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at
307.  As the above analysis might indicate, however, we believe
that the District Court gave adequate consideration to
defendants’ expert testimony.  Both the District Court and the
Special Master extensively addressed Dr. Jarrell’s discussion of
the effects of the Efficient Market Hypothesis on the materiality
inquiry and Rule 23’s predominance requirement.  By contrast,
the district court in Hydrogen Peroxide erroneously believed
that “it was barred from resolving disputes between the
plaintiffs’ and defendants’ experts” and therefore failed to
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consider “all relevant evidence and arguments, including
relevant expert testimony of the parties,” as required by Rule 23.
Id. at 325.  Here, the District Court did not ignore or dismiss
Dr. Jarrell’s opinion; it found it inapplicable to the case.
It is interesting to note, as well, that defendants’ expert
did not specifically address the effect of market efficiency on
the predominance requirement in a § 11 class certification.
Indeed, Dr. Jarrell makes no mention of either Constar stock or
§ 11 in his report.  This is despite the fact that Dr. Jarrell is a
former Chief Economist of the SEC and is, presumably, as
qualified as anyone could be to make that argument.  Doubtless,
defendants’ argument would be much more convincing could
they point to any authority, expert or otherwise, for the
proposition that this theory is relevant in a § 11 case.   
For the reasons set forth above, we will AFFIRM the
Order of the District Court. 
